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HIS Article provides an update of certain significant develop-
ments in franchise law in Texas and in the Fifth Circuit during the
LSurvey period. This article also highlights cases involving dealer-
ships and distributorships that, in the authors' judgment, provide a rele-
vant backdrop for franchising. Of particular interest to the franchise
practitioner will be a wide range of court pronouncements on statutes,
from the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute and the Anti-Cybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act, to the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code and
the Texas Business and Commerce Code on covenants not to compete.
In addressing each of the specific areas that affect franchises and
franchise systems, however, the update does not attempt to explain the
entire body of franchise law but, instead, focuses on those cases which are
instructive on several topics involving multiple issues.
II. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
In Brown v. General Brick Sales Co.,2 a Texas Court of Appeals was
asked, on an accelerated interlocutory appeal, whether the trial court cor-
rectly refused to apply the fiduciary shield doctrine. In Brown, two em-
ployees of Boral Bricks ("Boral") visited Texas on several occasions to
negotiate an exclusive distributorship with General Brick Sales Co., Inc.
("General Brick Sales"). Eventually, Boral and General Brick Sales ver-
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bally agreed to an exclusive distributorship agreement where General
Brick Sales would maintain Boral as its major product line in exchange
for Boral's promise not to sell directly in the "exclusive territory."'3
When Boral came to Texas to talk to General Brick Sales about Boral
buying them out entirely, the negotiations broke down and General Brick
Sales sued the employees personally for breach of contract, fraud, negli-
gent misrepresentation, unfair competition and misappropriation of pro-
prietary information.4
The defendants contested personal jurisdiction, claiming the fiduciary
shield doctrine protected them from personal jurisdiction in Texas unless
they were advancing their own interests or were alto egos of their em-
ployer.5 They argued that the fiduciary shield doctrine should apply in
Texas to defeat specific jurisdiction based on tortious conduct unless a
plaintiff could show that the individual defendant acted in furtherance of
his or her own benefit. 6 On the contrary, General Brick Sales argued that
the fiduciary shield doctrine did not and should not apply in Texas, and
even if it did, the employees' tortious conduct could personally benefit
them.7
The trial court denied the defendants' special appearance, because
Texas had not adopted the fiduciary shield doctrine. 8 The court of ap-
peals conducted a de novo review of the trial court's order denying the
special appearance. 9 It began its review with a discussion of federal juris-
diction. The court noted that "under the federal constitutional test of due
process, a plaintiff must overcome two hurdles to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The plaintiff must show that
the defendant established minimum contacts with the forum state and
show that the assertion of jurisdiction comports with fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 10 Moreover, "in Texas, when specific jurisdiction is as-
serted, the cause of action must arise out of or relate to the nonresident
defendant's contact with the forum state in order to satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement.""I "Those activities must have been 'purposefully
directed' to the forum and the litigation must result from alleged injuries
that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities."'1 2 The court noted that
General Brick Sales asserted that its claims against the employees arose
"from purposeful acts committed by them in Texas and directed toward
3. Id. at 293.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 294. The employees argued that the trial court did not have personal jurisdic-
tion over them because they were non-residents of Texas and any contacts that occurred in
Texas were on behalf of their employer, as opposed to any individual capacity, and thus,
protected under the fiduciary shield doctrine.
6. Id.
7. Brown, 39 S.W.3d at 294.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 294 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
11. Id. (citing Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C.,
815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)).
12. Brown, 39 S.W.3d at 294 (citing Guardian, 815 S.W.2d at 228).
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persons and entities in Texas," thus affording Texas specific jurisdiction
over them.13
Next, the court of appeals discussed specific jurisdiction in Texas. The
court stated that "a Texas court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident if two conditions are met. First, the Texas long-arm statute
must authorize the exercise of jurisdiction; second, the exercise of juris-
diction must be consistent with federal and state constitutional guaran-
tees of due process.' 4 Texas has designed its own formula for specific
jurisdiction which requires showing: (1) minimum contacts; (2) substan-
tial connection between defendant and Texas arising from the actions or
conduct of the defendant; (3) the cause of action arises out of or relates to
the contacts with the state; and (4) the assumption of jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 15
The court's analysis of the fiduciary shield doctrine revealed that the
doctrine "provides that corporate officers are not subject to jurisdiction
in a foreign forum where their actions are taken in a representative ca-
pacity."' 16 Moreover, "in the jurisdictions where it applies, a plaintiff can
defeat its protection by showing that the individual defendant was ad-
vancing his own interest or that he was an alter ego of his employer. ' 17
The court noted that in Texas jurisdictions where the fiduciary shield doc-
trine has been applied, the courts "limited its application to jurisdictional
claims based on the theory of general jurisdiction as opposed to specific
jurisdiction."' 8 The court decided that since Texas courts are to exercise
jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process, they must look to the
United States Supreme Court when deciding whether to apply the fiduci-
ary shield doctrine to claims based on the theory of specific jurisdiction. 19
Therefore, the court held that the trial court correctly refused to apply
the fiduciary shield doctrine and decided that each defendant's contacts
should be separately alleged and tested.20 Because the only claim on ap-
peal was whether the trial court correctly refused application of the fidu-
ciary shield doctrine, the denial of the special appearance was affirmed.21
13. Id. at 295.
14. Id. (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 297-98 (citing Amoco Chem. Co. v. Tex. Tin. Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1192, 1201
(S.D. Tex. 1996).
17. Brown, 39 S.W.3d at 298 (citing Saktides v. Cooper, 742 F. Supp. 382, 385 (W.D.
Tex. 1990)).
18. Id. at 300.
19. Id. The court analyzed the United States Supreme Court's decision in Calder v.
Jones, 456 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, the Supreme Court refused to create a blanket ex-
ception to jurisdiction that fails to test each defendant's actions and contacts with the fo-
rum state separately.




B. CHOICE OF LAW
There are two cases decided during the survey period that consider the
importance and applicability of choice of law provisions in franchise and
dealership agreements. In Covert Chevrolet-Oldsmobile v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,22 Covert sold a new Grand Prix to Judy Riley. In 1996, Gen-
eral Motors (GM) issued a product recall relating to certain component
parts and radio wires located in the steering wheel. 23 Riley brought the
car to Covert's dealership for the necessary repairs. After Covert made
the repairs, Riley's daughter was involved in an accident in the car that
resulted in her death.24 Riley filed suit against Covert and GM alleging
the airbags on both the driver's and passenger's side improperly deployed
causing her daughter to lose control.25 Riley's petition made general alle-
gations against GM that were incorporated by reference into the claims
against Covert. 26
The Dealer Sales and Service Agreement between Covert and GM in-
cluded an indemnification provision stating that GM would assume the
defense of the Dealer and indemnify the Dealer against any judgment in
monetary damages in any suit naming the Dealer as a defendant relating
to any product that caused bodily injury or property damage because of
its design, manufacture or assembly, provided that the Dealer has not
altered the product.27 When Covert sent a request to GM for indemnifi-
cation, GM denied the request stating that the claims were independent
of those made against GM, and therefore, Covert was independently lia-
ble.28 Covert then filed cross claims against GM for indemnification.
In its cross claim, Covert argued that it was entitled to indemnification
pursuant to the Texas Product Liability Act, the Texas Motor vehicle
Commission Code, the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, and the
common law.29 GM defended that Michigan law controlled and, under
Michigan law, Covert was not entitled to indemnification. Based on the
arguments, the trial court granted GM's motion for summary judgment,
and Covert appealed. The issue before the court of appeals was which
state's law controlled the indemnification provision in the agreement. The
court looked at Meritor Automotive v. Ruan Leasing Co.30 to make its
determination. In Meritor, the Texas Supreme Court held that a manu-
facturer's duty to indemnify a seller for losses was invoked by the plain-
tiff's pleadings and joinder of the seller as a defendant in the products
22. Covert Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05-00-01170-CV,
2001 WL 950274, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas August 21, 2001, no pet. h.) (not designated for
publication).
23. Id. at *1.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *2.
26. Id.
27. Covert, 2001 WL 950274, at *2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 44 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 2001).
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liability action.31 Further, the manufacturer can negate its duty to indem-
nify the seller only by obtaining a finding that the seller's independent
conduct was a cause of the plaintiff's injury. 32 Because the seller's liabil-
ity for the plaintiff's injuries was never established in Meritor, the court
held the manufacturer was obligated to indemnify the seller for the costs
of its defense. 33 The court of appeals noted that as in Meritor, Covert's
independent liability was never established. Therefore, GM's obligation
to indemnify Covert was properly invoked and never negated. Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that as a matter of law, Covert was entitled
to indemnification from GM pursuant to the Texas Products Liability
Act, applying Texas law.34
The second noteworthy case considering the applicability of choice of
law provisions is Miller v. KFC Corp. (Miller 11).35 In Miller II, a Texas
federal court concluded that a choice-of-law clause providing that the
franchise agreement "shall be interpreted in accordance with and gov-
erned by" Kentucky law was too narrow to embrace tort claims.36 The
court, therefore, decided to apply the most significant relationship test to
the plaintiff's claim rather than to "defer to a choice of law provision that
merely governs the interpretation of the franchise agreement. '37 Be-
cause Texas was the state with the most significant relationship to the
controversy over the tort claim, the court applied Texas substantive law.38
The court noted that, if the clause had provided for application of Ken-
tucky law to "govern, construe and enforce all rights and duties" of the
parties, that would have been sufficient to cover tort claims.3
9
C. FORUM SELECTION
In Arctic Equipment of Texas, Inc. v. IMI Cornelius, Inc.,40 the North-
ern District of Texas was asked to decide whether to grant the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss based on the forum selection clause contained
in a distributorship agreement between the parties. In Arctic Equipment,
plaintiff, Arctic Equipment of Texas, Inc. ("Arctic"), sued defendant, IMI
Cornelius, Inc. ("IMI"), for breach of a distributorship agreement. Arctic
was a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Wichita
Falls, Texas. IMI was a foreign corporation with its principal place of
business in Minnesota. When Arctic filed suit in the Northern District of
Texas for breach of the agreement, IMI filed a motion to dismiss based on
31. Id. at 91.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Covert, 2001 WL 950274, at *3.
35. James Miller, Jr. v. KFC Corp., No. 3:99-CV-1566D, 2001 WL 585763 (N.D. Tex.
May 24, 2001) [hereinafter Miller II]. A detailed discussion of Miller II follows in Section
V Common Law Claims: Contract Issues.




40. No. 7:00-CV-208-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2674 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2001).
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the forum selection clause designating Minnesota as the venue for dis-
putes under the agreement. 41 The court carefully reviewed the argument
set forth by IMI, but decided that the proper determination to be made
was not whether to dismiss, but whether to transfer venue pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). The court noted that the existence of a forum selection
clause "designating Minnesota as the venue for disputes under the Agree-
ment does not make the Northern District of Texas an improper venue
requiring dismissal under 12(b)(3). '42
In its analysis, the court considered the Section 1404(a) factors includ-
ing: (1) the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the convenience of the par-
ties; (3) the interests of justice; and (4) the fairness of transfer in light of
the forum-selection clause and the parties' relative bargaining power.43
The court noted that transfer was preferable to dismissal in this case be-
cause an alternative forum was available. 44
The court looked to Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,45 where the Su-
preme Court held that forum selection clauses were "prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting
party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. '46 The court also
noted that in Bremen, the Supreme Court explained that "the existence
of a forum selection clause places a 'heavy burden' on the party seeking
to avoid its application. '47 Additionally, under § 1404(a) courts have the
discretion to accept jurisdiction over a case despite the fact that a forum
selection clause calls for jurisdiction in a different forum. 48
The Northern District followed the Supreme Court in noting that a
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating why his case should not be
transferred to the forum in which he contractually agreed to litigate. Arc-
tic admitted that the forum selection clause was valid, but argued that the
court should accept jurisdiction any way. Arctic argued that the court
should confer jurisdiction, because the events that gave rise to the suit
took place in the Northern District of Texas. 49 In support of its argu-
ment, Arctic pointed out that the all of the necessary witnesses resided in
the Northern District. The court was not persuaded by Arctic's argu-
ments, because Arctic failed to provide any evidence to support the en-
forcement of the agreement in the Northern District. Instead, it
determined that, from the court's review of the amended complaint, the
alleged wrongful acts of IMI probably took place at the defendant's head-
quarters in Minnesota, and most of the witnesses would likely be corpo-
41. Id. at *3.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *7 (citing Shaw Group, Inc. v. Natkin & Co., 907 F. Supp. 201, 203 (M.D. La.
1995)).
44. Id. at *4.
45. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
46. Arctic Equip. of Tex., Inc., 2001 WL 2674, at *6 (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10).
47. Id.
48. Section 1404(a) permits the transfer of a case "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2001).
49. Arctic Equip. of Tex., Inc., 2001 WL 2674, at *5.
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rations and businesses; therefore, the burden of their participation in
litigation in Minnesota did not outweigh the need to enforce an agree-
ment "that was freely and fairly negotiated between two experienced cor-
porations."' 50 When transferring the case to Minnesota, the court
concluded that the forum selection clause in the agreement was control-
ling and that it would exercise the discretion vested in it by §1404(a) and
not exercise its jurisdiction. 51
D. ARBITRATION
While it is neither a franchise nor a dealership case, because the Fifth
Circuit decides the issue of whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
preempts a Louisiana state statute, OPE International L.P. v. Chet Morri-
son Contractors, Inc. ("CMC"), 52 is an important case for franchisors and
franchisees. In OPE Int'l, disagreements between OPE and CMC, the
parties to an off-shore drilling contract, led OPE to file a demand for
arbitration with the Houston office of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. The contract contained a provision mandating that "all matters re-
lating to the validity, performance or interpretation of this subcontract
shall be governed by the relevant provisions of the main contract or, in
the absence of any provisions in the main contract, by the law of the state
of Texas without regard to the principles of conflict of laws."'53 Further,
the contract provided that "the parties stipulate and agree that the por-
tions of the subcontract work shall be performed outside of Louisiana
and that Subcontract Work is in interstate commerce and, therefore,
SUBCONTRACTOR specifically waives all redress to and rights and
remedies under Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2779." 54 After an
unsuccessful mediation attempt, OPE notified CMC that it wanted to re-
sume arbitration proceedings, but CMC refused. CMC filed suit in Loui-
siana "seeking damages and a declaration that the subcontract's
arbitration clause and choice-of-law provision violated public policy and
were void."' 55 In response, OPE filed a petition in Texas to compel arbi-
tration. The Southern District of Texas granted OPE's motion and or-
dered CMC to submit to arbitration in Houston and stayed the pending
Louisiana suit. The district court determined that the FAA 9 U.S.C. § 4
preempts section 9:2779 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes "to the extent
that the Louisiana statute prohibits the parties from enforcing out-of-
state choice-of-venue provisions. '56
50. Id. at *10.
51. Id.
52. 258 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2001).
53. Id. at 445.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. Section 9:2779 declares "null and void and unenforceable as against public
policy any provision in [certain construction subcontracts] . . .which requires a suit or




The Fifth Circuit had never previously determined whether the FAA
preempted section 9:2779; however, it had held that the FAA preempted
other state laws precluding parties from enforcing arbitration agree-
ments.57 In OPE Int'l, the court reviewed the lower court's decision us-
ing a two-step inquiry in deciding whether the parties must submit to
arbitration. The first step was deciding whether the parties agreed to arbi-
trate their dispute. The second step was deciding "whether legal con-
straints external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of
those claims."'58
In OPE Int'l, it was clear that both parties agreed to arbitrate their
dispute. According to CMC, the second step was not met because the
arbitration agreement was foreclosed by Louisiana statute. The relevant
statute provides that when one of the parties to the construction contract
is domiciled in Louisiana, and the work to be done and the equipment
and materials to be supplied involve construction projects in Louisiana,
provisions in the contract requiring disputes arising from the relationship
to be resolved in a forum outside of Louisiana or requiring their interpre-
tation to be governed by the laws of another state are inequitable and
against the public policy of Louisiana. 59 The Fifth Circuit turned to the
language of the United States Supreme Court to determine the enforce-
ability of the Louisiana statute. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,60 the court
held that "In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to re-
quire a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration." 6' Upon review of the decision
in Southland Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana statute di-
rectly conflicted with the FAA because it "conditions the enforceability
of arbitration agreements on selection of a Louisiana forum."'62 There-
fore, the Louisiana statute which prohibited such arbitration agreement
between CMC and OPE was void, and the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court properly compelled arbitration.63
A second case worth noting is Glazer's Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v.
Heineken USA, Inc. 64 In this case, Glazer's, the distributor, brought a
claim against Heineken for breach of contract and violation of state Beer
Industry Fair Dealing Law (the "Act"), among other claims.65 The dis-
tributorship agreement at issue contained a provision that the contract
57. OPE Int'l L.P., 258 F.3d at 447. See also Miller v. Pub. Storage Mgmt., Inc., 121
F.3d 215, 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1997); Ommani v. Doctor's Assocs., Inc., 789 F.2d 298, 299-300
(5th Cir. 1986); Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334,
337 (5th Cir. 1984).
58. OPE Int'l L.P., 258 F.3d at 446 (citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258
(5th Cir. 1996)).
59. Id.
60. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
61. OPE Int'l L.P., 258 F.3d at 446 (citing Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10).
62. Id. at 447.
63. Id. at 447-48.
64. No. 05-99-01685-CV, 2001 WL 727351 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 29, 2001, no pet.).
65. Id. at *1.
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was terminable only "for good cause."'66 In January 1999, Heineken ter-
minated the agreement, because it was dissatisfied with Glazer's perform-
ance.67 Glazer's filed an action against Heineken for violating section
102.74 of the Act, because "it lacked good cause to terminate" the agree-
ment.68 Heineken responded and moved the trial court to compel arbi-
tration based on the language of section 102.77(b) of the Act, which
provides that "if the manufacturer and distributor cannot agree on
whether 'good cause' for termination exists ... the matter may, at the
option of either the distributor or manufacturer, be submitted to" arbi-
tration.69 Glazer's filed for an interlocutory appeal to avoid arbitration
arguing that the Texas General Arbitration Act allows a party to appeal
from an interlocutory order granting or denying a request to compel arbi-
tration.70 The court disagreed and denied the appeal for want of jurisdic-
tion. Another issue the court was asked to decide was whether the
parties entered into a contractual agreement to arbitrate. Heineken ar-
gued that the agreement addressed termination for cause, incorporated
by reference the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code, and therefore showed
Glazer's agreement to arbitrate. Glazer's responded that the language in
the letter agreement referring to the regulations and laws of Texas was a
"choice of law" provision.71 The court rejected Heineken's argument
noting that there was no express writing in the letter agreement that indi-
cated that the parties were to submit an action to arbitration.72 Further,
the paragraph describing reasons for termination did not clearly show an
intent to arbitrate. 73 The court then addressed Glazer's argument that
the arbitration provision in the Act was unconstitutional under the Texas
constitution's open court's guaranty. Glazer's argued that the arbitration
provision in the Act delegated non-judicial entities the court's non-dele-
gable authority and duty to determine the judicial issues in the case in
violation of Article 5, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution.74 The court
agreed and granted the writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to va-
cate its order compelling arbitration.75
66. Id.
67. Id. at *2.
68. Id.
69. Glazer's Wholesale, 2001 WL 727351, at *2. Further, "the award of the arbitrators
shall be binding on the parties unless appealed within 10 days from the date of the award.
All proceedings on appeal shall be in accordance with and governed by the Texas General
Arbitration Act, as amended." Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at *5.
72. Id.
73. ld.




III. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION
AND NON-RENEWAL
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
Texas does not have a general franchise-specific relationship law that
regulates the relationship between franchisor and franchisee. Therefore,
creative franchisee attorneys are constantly looking for new causes of ac-
tion through which to raise franchise relationship-type issues. This past
year, two interesting antitrust cases arose in which franchisees sought to
find liability for relationship-type issues through alleged conspiracies
among parties to the franchise relationship. In Lake Hill Motors, Inc. v.
Jim Bennet Yacht Sales, Inc.,76 a dealer of Yamaha personal watercraft
sued its manufacturer and several other dealers alleging federal antitrust
violations. 77 The dealer had a non-exclusive dealership and competed
against certain dealers named in the suit.78 The manufacturer did not
require the dealer to sell its products to consumers at or above any partic-
ular price, but the dealer sued, alleging, among other things, that the
manufacturer and certain other dealers of Yamaha personal watercraft
conspired to fix the minimum resale price of Yamaha personal watercraft
and to terminate a Yamaha dealer for charging less than that fixed price,
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.79
The manufacturer and the other dealers were granted summary judg-
ment on the three antitrust claims after the conclusion of discovery. The
district court held that the dealer had failed to name more than one
dealer who took part in the alleged horizontal conspiracy to fix prices
and that, in the alternative, the dealer had failed to show any injury re-
sulting from the alleged conspiracy. 80
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first focused on the dealer's claim that the
manufacturer and certain other dealers conspired to fix the minimum re-
sale price of Yamaha personal watercraft. 81 The court, however, set aside
the determination of whether a conspiracy was proven at trial and fo-
cused on whether the dealer could show any injury from the alleged con-
spiracy. 82 The Fifth Circuit held that the dealer had "produced no
evidence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that it
76. 246 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 2001).
77. Id. at 754.
78. Id.
79. Id. The dealer also alleged that Yamaha's cooperative advertising program, which
reimbursed dealers for advertising only when that advertising stated either Yamaha's sug-
gested retail price or no price, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act and that the manufacturer
monopolized the market for personal watercraft in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. Id.
80. Id. at 754-55.
81. Lake Hill Motors, Inc., 246 F.3d at 755.
82. Id. (noting that "a private plaintiff must show some injury to his business or prop-
erty which results from some violation of the antitrust laws to recover damages under § 4
of the Clayton Act. United Indus., Inc. v. Eimco Process Equip. Co., 61 F.3d 445, 448 (5th
Cir. 1995); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1988)").
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was injured as a result of this alleged conspiracy. '83 The fact that the
appellant could show that one of the other dealers "disliked and com-
plained about other Yamaha dealers who sold personal watercraft below
Yamaha's suggested retail price" and that an executive for the manufac-
turer chastised the appellant several years earlier for cutting prices below
the manufacturer's suggested retail price and threatened termination if
prices did not increase, was insufficient to show injury as a result of any
conspiracy since the appellant was never terminated, even though it did
not raise its prices after the alleged threats were made. 84 Accordingly,
the Fifth Circuit held that the dealer had no cause of action under §4 of
the Clayton Act and was not entitled to injunctive relief under §16 of the
Clayton Act since there was no proof of any genuine threat sufficient to
justify injunctive relief under section 16.85
In Search International, Inc. v. Snelling and Snelling, Inc.,86 a Texas fed-
eral district court addressed the question of whether alleged anti-compet-
itive acts between a franchisor and its franchisees constituted concerted
action for proving a conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 87
The Snelling franchisee claimed that Snelling restrained its competitive
abilities by requiring it to enter into an "unconscionable" franchise agree-
ment which permitted Snelling to establish or operate a company store at
any location, prohibited its franchisees from opening stores at locations
not approved by Snelling, and prohibited franchisees from competing
with Snelling under any other personnel services business unless ap-
proved by Snelling.88
The Snelling franchisee claimed that, since Snelling operated a com-
pany store in Richardson and was unable to meet the needs of the city,
Snelling's refusal to allow Search International to expand into Richard-
son, Texas injured the public by depriving Richardson of a "needed per-
manent professional placement and contract office." 89 The Snelling
franchisee further alleged that Snelling restrained the competitive abili-
ties of other franchisees by using information acquired pursuant to the
franchise agreement to benefit company stores and by refusing to allow
other franchisees to operate in areas in which Snelling wishes to expand
its territories in the future. 90
To succeed in proving a conspiracy, the Snelling franchisee was re-
quired to prove "(1) the existence of an agreement (2) which unreasona-
bly restrains trade (3) to the damage of the plaintiff." 91 The court
focused on the first element, finding that "the Amended Complaint
83. Id. at 756.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 757.
86. 168 F. Supp. 2d 621 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
87. Id. at 625.
88. Id. at 624.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Search Int'l, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
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reveals a unity of interests between Snelling and its franchisees such that
these two entities are incapable of conspiring within the meaning of Sec-
tion 1.' '92 Focusing on the Supreme Court's principle that the coordi-
nated activity of a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary
must be viewed as that of a single enterprise,93 the court confirmed that
this principle has been imputed to the franchise relationship through
three different districts that have held that "a franchisor is incapable of
conspiring with its franchisee under the Copperweld rationale. '94 The
court focused on the interdependency of the franchise relationship in
finding that the economic interests of Snelling and its franchisees are in-
extricably linked and that Snelling maintains almost complete control of
the franchisees. 95 Therefore, the court found no liability under Section 1
of the Sherman Act because there was no evidence that Snelling and its
franchised stores were in competition or that Snelling was capable of, or
had actually conspired against, its franchisees. 96 The Snelling case is an
example of a case where a franchisor's control over its system enabled it
to avoid liability.
B. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
Although, as noted above, Texas does not have a franchise-specific
statute governing the relationship between franchisor and franchisee, it
does have certain industry-specific laws that govern the relationship be-
tween franchisors and franchisees. The Texas Motor Vehicle Commission
Code (the Code) 97 governs the distribution, sale and leasing of motor
vehicles in Texas and, among other things, restricts a motor vehicle manu-
facturer's ability to terminate or fail to renew any franchise with a
dealer.98 Specifically, the Code requires a manufacturer to provide a
dealer with at least sixty days prior written notice of the effective date of
termination or nonrenewal and notify the dealer that it may file a timely
protest with the Texas Motor Vehicle Board (the Board).99 Several Texas
cases this past year have considered the scope of authority and jurisdic-
tion of the Board to hear disputes between manufacturers and dealers.
In Lone Star R. V. Sales, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Board of the Texas De-
partment of Transportation,00 the Court of Appeals for the Third District
of Texas upheld a determination by the Board finding good cause for the
termination of a dealer's franchise agreement and, in doing so, confirmed
92. Id. at 626.
93. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (address-
ing the "unity of interests" concept).
94. Search Int'l, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d at 625. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d
445 (9th Cir. 1993).
95. Search Int'l, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
96. Id. at 626-27.
97. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 2000).
98. Id. at §5.02(b)(3)(A).
99. Id.
100. 49 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet. h.)
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the Board's discretionary powers.10 1 The dealer filed a notice of protest
with the Board after receiving a notice of termination from the manufac-
turer on grounds that the dealer had failed to honor its warranty obliga-
tions, had a poor sales history, had disparaged the manufacturer's
products, had a lack of commitment to the manufacturer's products, and
had a history of verbal abuse and threats made by the dealer's employees
to the manufacturer's employees.'0 2 Despite evidence that the relation-
ship had deteriorated, an administrative law judge appointed by the
Board made a recommendation that since the manufacturer had not es-
tablished good cause for termination, 10 3 the notice of protest should be
granted However, the Board disagreed and found good cause for termi-
nation, in part by relying on the fact that the exceptions were not filed on
time.104 On appeal, the court confirmed the Board's actions on grounds
that it had properly exercised its discretion by accepting and considering
the untimely exceptions and affirmed the finding of substantial evidence
supporting franchisor's claim of verbal abuse and hostility on the part of
the dealer's employees. 10 5
The extent of the Board's authority was also considered in Sportscoach
Corp. of America Inc. v. Eastex Camper Sales, Inc.,106 in which the Third
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas held that the Board does
not have the authority to order a manufacturer to pay a dealer amounts
owed for violations of the Code.10 7 The dealer's Sportcoach recreational
vehicle franchise was terminated in 1991.108 At the time of termination,
the dealer had four 1990 model-year Sportcoach vehicles in stock for
which the dealer demanded repurchase pursuant to the Code.' 0 9 Sport-
scoach refused repurchase on grounds that the 1992 model-year had be-
gun before the termination date, and therefore, it had no repurchase
obligation as to the 1990 model-year stock. The terminated dealer sold
the vehicles through other means and filed a complaint with the Board
seeking damages.110 The Board ordered Sportscoach to pay the dealer
$7,847.60 in dealer costs, $12,192.11 in attorney's fees and $200 in filing
fees, plus interest.1 The district court affirmed the finding of the Board
and Sportcoach appealed on grounds that the Code does not grant the
101. Id. at 494.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 495.
105. Lone Star R.V. Sales, Inc., 49 S.W.3d at 501-02.
106. 31 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.)
107. Id. at 736.
108. Id. at 731.
109. Id. at 731-32. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(b)(16)(A) (Vernon
Supp. 2000). The Code provides that it is unlawful for a manufacturer to fail to pay a
dealer upon termination of the dealer's franchise, for unsold new motor vehicles of the
current model year or of the immediately prior model year in the dealer's inventory. Id. at
§ 5.02(b)(16)(F). A manufacturer that fails to make such payments within 60 days of ter-
mination is liable for the greatest of dealer costs, fair market value, or current price of the
inventory, interest, attorney's fees, and costs. Id.




Board authority to order payment to the dealer.112
The court reversed after finding that the legislature had not given the
Board the power to adjudicate private claims, and had not granted the
Board authority to order a manufacturer to pay a dealer amounts owed
for violations of the Code. 113 The court first acknowledged its prior deci-
sion in Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Commis-
sion.,114 which involved the Board's predecessor, the Motor Vehicle
Commission," 5 and held that payments to a private party were not per-
mitted under the then applicable Code. 16 Although the Code was
amended in 1989,117 the court rejected the dealer's claim that amend-
ments to Section 3.03 of the Code to grant the Board authority to "assess
and collect fees and costs including attorney's fees" constituted specific
statutory authority to adjudicate section 5.02(b)(16) claims.1 18 Instead,
the court noted that, while the Board was provided specific powers, in-
cluding the power to assess a civil penalty, issue a cease and desist order,
and issue an injunction, the Board does not have authority to order that
damages be paid to a private party. Still, the court found that there was
substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that Sportscoach
violated the Code and remanded for judgment consistent with that at the
district court.' 19
Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,120 addressed
the interrelation between a district court's original jurisdiction and the
Board's original jurisdiction under the Code.' 2 ' A Subaru franchisee ter-
minated his franchise after its franchisor refused to honor a previous ver-
bal consent to the relocation of the franchisee's dealership. The
franchisee then sued the franchisor in a Texas state district court.122 The
franchisor moved for summary judgment on grounds that the franchisee
had failed to bring his claims before the Board before bringing suit in the
district court. 12 3 The state district court granted summary judgment, and
the court of appeals affirmed.' 24
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals after finding
that the Texas Legislature did not grant the Board exclusive jurisdiction
112. Id. at 732-33.
113. Id. at 735-36.
114. 855 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
115. Act of August 26,1991, 72d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 7, § 1A.03, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 226,
238 (TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), since amended).
116. Sportscoach Corp. of Am., Inc., 31 S.W.3d at 734; Kawasaki Motors, 855 S.W.2d at
797.
117. Act of June 16, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 1130, §§9, 11, 24, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws
4653, 4657, 4658, 4665 (TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), since amended).
118. Sportscoach Corp. of Am. Inc., 31 S.W.3d at 735.
119. Id. at 736.
120. No. 00-0292, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 49 (May 31, 2001).
121. Id. at *1.
122. Id. at *34.
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id. at *5. See David McDavid Nissan, Inc, v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1999), rev'd, No. 00-0292, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 49 (May 31, 2001).
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over all claims related to motor vehicle dealerships. 125 The court found
that, although the Code states that "the board has general and original
power and jurisdiction to regulate all aspects of the distribution, sale, and
leasing of motor vehicles," the Texas Legislature did not confer exclusive
jurisdiction on the Board to address all issues or disputes related to motor
vehicle sale and distribution.126 Instead, the court held that the Board's
exclusive jurisdiction extends only to those issues expressly identified in
the Code as exclusively within the Board's purview. 127 Since the fran-
chisee's claims included claims both within and outside of the Board's
exclusive jurisdiction, the court held that the state district court and the
Board could each concurrently exercise jurisdiction as to those claims
over which the Board did not have exclusive jurisdiction.'28
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY/TRADEMARKS
A. INTERNET
In Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation,2 9 the Fifth
Circuit ruled that a provision of the Code that specifically prohibits vehi-
cle manufacturers from owning, operating, or acting in the capacity of a
dealer within the state was not unconstitutional when applied to prohibit
a vehicle manufacturer from selling pre-owned vehicles to consumers
over the Internet. 130 Ford challenged the Code under the Commerce
Clause and the First Amendment guarantee of free speech and argued
that the law was vague, denied it equal protection of the laws and denied
it due process in the state's enforcement of the statute. 31 After the fed-
eral district court for the Western District of Texas upheld the Code, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding first that the Code did not violate the Com-
merce Clause, because Ford failed to demonstrate that the statute dis-
criminated based on a contacts analysis and also failed to demonstrate
that the Code burdened interstate commerce by inhibiting the flow of
interstate goods. 132 The Fifth Circuit held that the state's asserted pur-
pose for passing the Code-to prevent vertically integrated companies
from taking advantage of their market position and to prevent frauds,
unfair practices, discrimination, impositions, and other abuses of its citi-
zens-were legitimate state interests that the Code could reasonably be
believed to protect.133
The Fifth Circuit also held that the Code did not constitute an unconsti-
tutional restriction of the First Amendment right to free speech because
Ford's advertising and sale of vehicles over the Internet was part and par-
125. Subaru of Am., Inc., 2001 Tex. LEXIS 49, at *26.
126. Id. at *20-26.
127. Id. at *26.
128. Id. at *27.
129. 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001).
130. Id. at 498.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 499-505.
133. Id. at 502-03.
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cel of the proscribed conduct-retailing motor vehicles without a li-
cense. 134 Since Ford's speech did not concern a lawful activity, any
restriction on that speech was only incidental to the state's regulation of
that activity. 135 The court rejected the vagueness claim, because the
Texas statute sufficiently defined the proscribed conduct of acting in the
capacity of a dealer as the buying, selling, or exchanging of motor vehi-
cles.' 36 The Fifth Circuit also rejected Ford's equal protection argument
that there was no rational basis for classifying manufacturers differently
than dealers and that no rational basis existed to justify differential treat-
ment for its website on grounds that the Code bore a reasonable relation-
ship to the state's legitimate purpose of controlling the automobile
market and that any differential treatment provided to the General Mo-
tors Internet site was justified, because General Motors had licensed the
operation of its site to an independent company that had applied for and
received a dealer license in Texas. 137
Finally, the court found that the manufacturer was not denied due pro-
cess, because of a letter sent by the Texas Department of Transportation
advising dealerships that their participation in the manufacturer's In-
ternet sales was illegal.138 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the letter car-
ried no weight in subsequent administrative proceedings and that Ford
offered no proof overcoming the presumption of fairness of the
proceedings. 39
B. INFRINGEMENT/ENFORCEMENT
In Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc.,140 the franchisor of the Dial One plumbing and heating service busi-
ness and two of its existing franchisees brought suit under the Lanham
Act 141 against the publishers of a local telephone directory on the basis
that the publishers' failure to remove an incorrect telephone listing for a
former Dial One franchisee constituted infringement of the Dial One
trademark. The franchisor had terminated franchisee U.A. Durr in Janu-
ary 1998 and notified the publishers of the Yellow Pages and White Pages
for southeastern Louisiana. 142 The defendant publishers nonetheless
listed Durr as a franchisee of Dial One in the May 1998 edition of the
Yellow pages and the October 1998 edition of the White pages. 143
The trial court entered judgment for the franchisor and its franchisees
and awarded damages, but the defendant publishers appealed on grounds
134. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d at 504-07.
135. Id. at 505-07.
136. Id. at 508-10.
137. Id. at 510-11.
138. Id. at 511-12.
139. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d at 493.
140. 269 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2001).





that the trial court erred in not applying an actual-malice standard to the
innocent infringer defense under §1114(2) of the Lanham Act.144 The
innocent infringer defense limits persons bringing actions under
§§1114(1) and 1125(a) to injunctive relief if the defendant is an "innocent
infringer.' 1 45 The defendant publishers contended that the trial court
erred in using a standard of objective reasonableness to review their con-
duct and determine their status as innocent infringers. 146 Under the stan-
dard of objective reasonableness, a defendant is an innocent infringer
only if its conduct is reasonable, regardless of state of mind. 147 The
United States district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that
the publishers' actions in failing to remove the incorrect listings were not
objectively reasonable. 148
The Fifth Circuit looked to the language of the statute 149 and noted
that:
[o]n its face, "innocent infringer" suggests a party who is without
blame, but also may connote one who is without knowledge of a
wrong or who has no improper motive. The latter interpretation sug-
gests an unremarkable legal scheme whereunder any "infringer" will
be held accountable, but an "innocent infringer" will not be subject
to as stiff a penalty. Our task is to determine the legal significance of
the term "innocent.' '1 50
Noting that the issue was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the
court held that the objective reasonableness standard was the proper
standard for evaluating whether an infringer was innocent.' 5' The Fifth
Circuit rejected the publishers' attempt to link their speech to the protec-
tion of the Constitution and found there was no constitutional mandate to
protect the publishers' type of speech under the heightened actual malice
standard, that certain inconsistencies in the legislative history were not
probative and most importantly, "the logic of the actual malice standard
is not appropriate in this context."'152
The Fifth Circuit focused on the United States Supreme Court holding
that matters not of public concern are not judged under the actual-malice
standard 153 in finding that, "[a]lthough the trademark at issue in this case
was certainly a matter of public consumption, the improper listing of a
service repair business is hardly a matter of public concern such that the
improper listing should be protected. '154 The Fifth Circuit went even fur-
ther to state that the pubic interest is best served by the lesser objective
144. Id.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)
146. Dial One of the Mid-South Inc., 268 F.3d at 525-26.
147. Id. at 525.
148. Id.
149. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (holding the best evidence of this
intent is the language of the statute).
150. Dial One of the Mid-South Inc., 268 F.3d at 527.
151. Id. at 526-27.
152. Id.
153. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1989).
154. Dial One of the Mid-South Inc., 268 F.3d at 527.
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reasonableness test "to promote accuracy in this type of speech.' 155
C. CYBERSQUA-tTING
In Texas, the victims of cybersquatters have in the past had to rely
solely on the injunctive relief options under the Texas Anti-Dilution Stat-
ute. 156 The Texas Anti-Dilution Statute permits a party to enjoin an act
that is likely to dilute the distinctive quality of a registered or otherwise
protectable mark. 157 The party must prove ownership of the mark and a
likelihood of dilution.' 58 In November of 1999, Congress passed the
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 59 which offers
additional protections and enforcement tools for traditional trademark
infringement claims under the Lanham Act, 160 federal 61 or state trade-
mark dilution statutes 62 and common law unfair competition.
The ACPA provides for civil liability to the owner of a mark in circum-
stances of where it is determined the registrant: (1) has a bad faith intent
to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is protected as
a mark under this section; and (2) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain
name that in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registra-
tion of the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of
the domain name is identical to or dilutive of that mark. .163
Three recent Texas cases addressed claims under the Texas Anti-Dilu-
tion Statute and the ACPA. Each of these cases could affect franchisors
who desire to combat cybersquatters in Texas courts. In Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,' 64 Lockheed Martin sued domain name
registrar Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), 165 claiming that it was liable
under both the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute and the ACPA for holding
the registrations of several domain names that had been registered by
cybersquatters. 166 Lockheed Martin alleged that NSI's registration of the
domain names diluted the marks under the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute
and that NSI had a "bad faith intent" to profit from the registration of
domain names by accepting registrations from cybersquatters, in violation
155. Id.
156. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West 2001).
157. Id.
158. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1564 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
160, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
162. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. Co1E ANN. § 16.29.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A); 15 U.S.C. § 1129.
164. 141 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Tex 2001).
165. Id. at 651. NSI screens domain name applications against a registry database of
existing registrations and maintains a directory link which linked domain names with the
Internet Protocol (IP) numbers of domain name services. Id.
166. Id. at 655. Interestingly, Lockheed Martin had previously sued NSI for trademark
infringement, contributory trademark infringement and trademark dilution before the
ACPA was enacted, but lost the case. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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of the ACPA. 167
The district court for the Northern District of Texas granted NSI's mo-
tion for summary judgment under both the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute
and the ACPA, holding that there was "no evidence that Defendant is a
person that registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name." 168 With respect
to the ACPA, the Court focused on NSI's obligations under its agreement
with ICANN in determining that NSI did not make independent judg-
ments to determine the domain name registrant's rights in the domain
name, did not consult with third parties prior to accepting a registration
and did not monitor the use of the domain name after it is registered. 169
Further, the court noted that Congress did not intend to make domain
name registries such as NSI the gatekeepers of the registry to protect
trademark owners.170 The court noted that the sheer volume of domain
name registrations would prevent the proper administration of any regis-
try if it had to check every domain name against the trademark rights of
others prior to accepting the registration.171 Finally, the court noted that
a "safe harbor" provision was written into Section 32 of the Lanham
Act172 that specifically addresses the imposition of damages against do-
main name registries based on underlying trademark rights173 such that
there is no independent cause of action under the ACPA against domain
name registries.' 74
In addressing the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute claim, the court focused
on whether NSI's registration of the mark constituted "use" for purposes
of satisfying the requirements of the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute and de-
termined that the third party registrant was the true owner and user of
the mark and that NSI's mere act of registering the mark did not satisfy
the use requirements of the Texas Anti Dilution Statute. 75 The Lock-
heed Martin case stands for the proposition that a victim of a cybersquat-
ter will not be able to hold a domain name registrar liable for the acts of a
registrant.
In E&J Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd. ,176 the district court for the
Southern District of Texas found dilution under the Texas Anti-Dilution
Statute and bad faith under the ACPA on the part of an Internet domain
name broker that had registered nearly 2,000 domain names, including
"ERNESTANDJULIOGALLO.COM.' 77 Defendant Spider Webs also
167. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 651.
168. Id. at 655.
169. Id. at 650. NSI must comply with consensus policies adopted by the Internet Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) which includes abiding by the Uni-
form Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(d)(ii).
173. Lockheed Martin Corp., 141 F. Supp. 2d at 655.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 656.
176. 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
177. Id. at 1047.
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used the domain name to create a web site devoted to the ills of alcohol
consumption and news concerning the lawsuit between the parties. 178
The court found wrongful use of the web site and dilution under the
Texas Anti-Dilution Statute and ordered an injunction. 179
With respect to the ACPA, Spider Webs argued that damages were not
available under the ACPA, because it had registered the domain name
before the enactment of the ACPA.180 The court, however, looked to the
use of the domain name and noted that because Spider Webs actually
used the domain name after the effective date of the ACPA, it was subject
to the damage provisions. 181 Further, the court reviewed the evidence
that Spider Webs initially held the domain name and only developed the
website after the lawsuit was brought. 82 The court followed the Second
Circuit's decision in Sporty's Farm v. Sportsmen's Market,183 and held
that Spider Webs had registered the domain name with a bad faith intent
to profit. 184 The court ordered a transfer of the domain name and also
awarded damages in the amount of $25,000.185
Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls International, Inc. 186 is another
Texas case that reflects the use of the Texas Anti-Dilution Statute and the
ACPA in dealing with sophisticated and opportunistic cybersquatters.' 87
This case is of interest to franchisors whose names are based on the sur-
names of the franchisor's founders. Although Fisher Controls had regis-
tered multiple FISHER-related trademarks, had operated under the
FISHER name since the 1880's and even had a previous registration of
the FISHER.COM domain name, Fisher Controls had allowed the do-
main name to lapse by accident and NSI put the domain name on a list of
expired domains which were to be released to the public as available for
registration. 188 Registral.com's affiliate, The Commbine.com, used a
computer software program to search the list of soon to be expired do-
main names, and Registral.com subsequently registered the
FISHER.COM domain name two minutes after it was released to the
public for registration. 189
Registral.com sought protection on grounds that "Fisher" was a rela-
tively common surname and that it intended to create a genealogy web-
site, but the district court for the Southern District of Texas rejected this
claim and held for Fisher Controls on both the Texas Anti-Dilution Stat-
ute claim and the ACPA claim after finding that Fisher Controls had "ac-
178. Id. at 1039-40.
179. Id. at 1042.
180. Id. at 1035.
181. E&J Gallo Winery, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
182. Id.
183. 203 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000).
184. E&J Gallo Winery, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
185. Id. at 1048.
186. No. H-01-1423, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10002 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
187. Id. at *15-25.




quired distinctiveness" in the name through very long use of the mark in
commerce and its extensive advertising and promotional activities and
that Registral.com and Commbine.com were notorious cybersquatters
and had done little to actually move forward with stated plans to open a
Fisher genealogy website.190
V. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACr ISSUES
In Miller v. KFC Corp. (Miller 11),191 a current and former franchisee
(collectively "Miller") sued KFC when Miller failed to obtain a proposed
location containing a three-in-one restaurant. Under the parties'
franchise agreement, KFC was required to inform Miller of proposed new
KFC locations and allow Miller to bid on them.192 KFC notified Miller of
a proposed new location and noted that it may be developed as a three-
in-one (KFC/Taco Bell/Pizza Hut). 193 Miller was interested, bid on the
location as a three-in-one, and KFC rejected the bid.' 94 After several
rounds of negotiations, KFC agreed to allow Miller to open a KFC at the
location.195 Miller was unable to secure the Taco Bell franchise and
opened a two-in-one location (KFC/Pizza Hut).' 96 Apparently disap-
pointed by KFC's and Taco Bell's actions concerning the three-in-one,
Miller filed suit for (1) breach of the franchise agreement, (2) breach of
the duty of good faith under the agreement, (3) tortious interference with
prospective business relationships, (4) promissory/equitable estoppel, and
(5) breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.' 97 KFC moved
for summary judgment on all of the claims. 198
First, Miller argued that KFC breached the franchise agreement and
failed to negotiate in good faith with Miller regarding the application for
a three-in-one restaurant.' 99 Miller based the obligation on the franchise
agreement and the fact that all three restaurant entities were subsidiaries
of one corporation.200 KFC countered that under the plain terms of the
franchise agreement it was obligated only to negotiate for a KFC loca-
tion, not a three-in-one, and KFC had no control over the other entities
despite any corporate relationship. The court agreed with KFC and held
KFC did not have an obligation to offer a three-in-one under the terms of
190. Id. at *22.
191. James Miller, Jr. v. KFC Corporation, No. 3:99-CV-1566-D, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS. 8537 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2001) [hereinafter Miller Ill.
192. Id. at *3.
193. Id. at *5.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Miller 11, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8537.
197. Id. at *8
198. Id.; in James Miller, Jr. v. KFC Corp., Civ. A.3:99-CV-1566-D, No. 1999 WL
820389 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 1999) the court dismissed Miller's claims against Taco Bell and
denied KFC's motion to dismiss.




the franchise agreement and thus there was no duty to breach, good faith
or otherwise.201 The court did, however, find sufficient facts that would
support Miller's claims for breach of contract and the duty of good faith
as it relates to the negotiation of the KFC location and denied KFC's
summary judgment on that claim.
Second, Miller claimed that as a result of not being awarded the three-
in-one, Miller was precluded from entering into contractual relationships
with potential customers and KFC tortiously interfered with these rela-
tionships.202 The court granted KFC's Summary Judgment due to
Miller's failure to introduce any evidence that he would have obtained
the rights from the other entities to open a three-in-one that would have
resulted in contractual relationships with customers.20 3 Without these
rights, Miller did not have the ability to open the locations which Miller
alleged would result in a contractual relationship.20 4
Third, Miller argued that the location notification letter was a promise/
offer to open the three-in-one location subject to Taco Bell and Pizza
Hut's approval.2 05 The court rejected this argument and held that the let-
ter merely invited plaintiffs to apply to operate a new KFC outlet that
may be operated as a three-in-one location pending the approval of Taco
Bell and Pizza Hut.2°6 Since there was no promise to operate a three-in-
one, there could be no justifiable reliance on this promise, which is a basic
element of a promissory estoppel claim.207
Finally, the court addressed the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Relying on prior Texas precedent,20 8 the court held that, in the
absence of a special relationship, KFC was entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law dismissing plaintiffs' tort claim for breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing, as there was no duty outside of the parties'
written agreement. 20 9
In Haase v. Glazner, the Texas Supreme Court held that a contract to
sell a franchise was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and could
not support a fraud or fraudulent inducement claim. 210 Glazner worked
for Haase at a Whataburger and Haase had promised to sell his franchise
to Glazner. The negotiations were set forth in three letters that were sent
to Whataburger, but Whataburger never granted a franchise to Glazner.
Glazner sued Haase alleging breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent induce-
ment and unjust enrichment. 211 Haase moved for summary judgment,
201. Id. at *9-13.
202. Id. at *14-16.
203. Id. at *15-16.
204. Miller 11, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8537.
205. Id. at *17.
206. Id. at *18.
207. Id.
208. See Crim. Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594
(Tex. 1992).
209. Miller II, at *19-20.




and it was granted. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment
on all claims except those for fraud and fraudulent inducement.212 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed on the fraudulent inducement claim and
held that, without a contract, there could be no claim that a party was
fraudulently induced to enter into a contract. 213 On the fraud claim, the
court held that to the extent Glazer sought to recover the benefit of the
bargain of a contract that was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
the Statute barred the claim.214 The court, however, did find that any
claim for out of pocket damages was extra-contractual and would survive
the Statute of Frauds.215
In Southwest Materials Handling Co. v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.,216
plaintiff alleged several breach of contract and breach of implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealings claims premised on the allegation that
Nissan breached the non-exclusive dealership agreement between the
parties by appointing another dealer within plaintiff's area of primary re-
sponsibility. Plaintiff plead over thirty separate counts against Nissan
which, in the court's words, "are thrown against the wall, in the apparent
hope that some will stick. None do."1217 Plaintiff alleged several breach
of contract claims based on the premise that Nissan breached the dealer-
ship agreement by appointing another dealer within the plaintiff's pri-
mary area of responsibility. 218 The court analyzed the plain language of
the dealership agreement and ruled that the agreement granted a non-
exclusive territory and summary judgment was proper as a matter of
law.
2 1 9
B. FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION
In Patel v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc.,220 plaintiffs plead that
the franchisor defendant engaged in a fraudulent scheme surrounding the
parties' franchise agreement and certain property and improvements
under the agreement. 221 Defendants moved for dismissal due to plain-
tiffs' failure to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and plaintiffs' failure to state a
claim with respect to the claims of breach of contract, promissory estop-
pel, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and violation of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA).
While the court denied defendant's motion, the court found that plaintiffs
failed to comply with the particularity pleading requirement of Rule 9(b)
212. Id. at 141-42.
213. Id. at 142-43.
214. Id. at 143.
215. Haase v. Glazner, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 144.
216. No. 3:98-CV-2367-X, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16275 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2000).
217. Id.
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id.
220. Jagdish Patel v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 821 (N.D.




with respect to claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and
granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint to cure this de-
fect.222 The court found that all the fraud and state of mind allegations
made by the plaintiffs were impermissibly general, and that plaintiffs' fail-
ure to sort out the wrongdoing of each defendant was improper.223 The
court also found that plaintiffs failed to provide defendants proper notice
as required under the DTPA (60 days) prior to filing suit, and plaintiffs'
claims would be held in abeyance until plaintiffs complied with this
requirement.22 4
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Cole v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., a Century 21 franchisee (Larry
Jolley) purchased a competing reality business (ReMax), including the
business' phone numbers.225 Appellants Lynda Cole and ReMax Heri-
tage Real Estate (together "Cole") owned the only remaining ReMax lo-
cation in the area. ReMax contacted Jolley and Century 21 and asked
that Jolley inform anyone calling the former ReMax numbers that he was
not affiliated with ReMax. Century 21 informed ReMax and Cole that it
would not allow its franchisee to utilize the ReMax name or intellectual
property. Jolley however, allegedly continued to use the numbers and to
deceive ReMax customers. Cole sued Jolley and Century 21 for inten-
tional interference with prospective contracts, defamation, common-law
fraud, and violations of the statutory-fraud provisions of the Texas Busi-
ness and Commerce Code. Century 21 filed a motion for summary judg-
ment. The court held that in order for Cole to prevail on any causes of
action against Century 21, Century 21 must be held vicariously liable for
the acts of its franchisee Jolley and have the right to control, and exert
control over, the actions made the basis of Cole's claims.226 The court
analyzed the Jolley's franchise agreement with Century 21 and found that
the agreement specifically stated that Jolley was an independent contrac-
tor and that Jolley could only operate the franchise as a Century 21.227 In
the face of that record, the court affirmed the trial court order granting
Century 21's motion for summary judgment.228
D. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
In Fun Motors of Longview, Inc. v. Gratty, Inc.,229 a dealer and a deal-
ership were found liable for tortious interference with a contract, and on
222. Id. at 825.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 826.
225. Cole v. Century 21 Real Estates, No. 3-99-00870-CV, 2000 WL 1784317 (Tex.
App.-Austin December 7, 2000, no pet. h.).
226. Id. at *2.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Fun Motors of Longview, Inc. v. Gratty, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2001, pet. filed).
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appeal attacked a number of the trial court's findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law with respect to the various elements of the cause at issue.
Fun Motors entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement for the sale of its
ongoing Kawasaki business on the condition precedent that Gratty obtain
Kawasaki's approval. Before Gratty's application for approval was sub-
mitted to Kawasaki, however, Fun Motors entered into another asset
sales agreement with a third party under similar terms. The third party's
application to Kawasaki was submitted three days after Gratty's applica-
tion. Kawasaki contacted Fun Motors to ask which application it should
consider. Fun Motors did not respond, and Kawasaki ultimately termi-
nated the Fun Motors sales and service agreement. Gratty filed suit
against Fun Motors and the president of Fun Motors (Louis Latch) claim-
ing breach of contract, violations of the DTPA and tortious interfer-
ence.230 Following a bench trial, Gratty was awarded judgment on its tort
claims against Latch, but a take nothing judgment was entered on the
claims against Fun Motors. 231
Fun Motors and Latch contested the legal sufficiency of the trial courts
findings. The court of appeals upheld the damage award for compensa-
tory losses as well as lost profits, reasoning that the evidence was both
legally and factually sufficient to show the dealer intentionally contracted
with another party, causing Gratty to fail to satisfy a condition precedent
(obtaining Kawasaki's approval) and thus interfering with the contract to
sell a dealership.2 32 In short, the dealer's act constituted third party inter-
ference sufficient to support a tortious interference claim.
E. IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
In Southwest Materials Handling Co. v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd.,233
plaintiff alleged a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing premised on the allegation that Nissan breached the non-exclusive
dealership agreement between the parties by appointing another dealer
within plaintiff's area of primary responsibility. Because a conflict of
laws issue was unresolved, the Southwest Materials court applied the laws
of both Texas and Illinois to each of plaintiff's claims.
Applying Texas law, the Southwest Materials court rejected plaintiff's
good faith and fair dealing argument, holding that "Texas courts recog-
nize an independent cause of action for the breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing only where a 'special relationship' exists between
the parties, one where there is substantially unequal bargaining power."
The court continued, "the 'special relationship' cause of action in tort for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, however, does not ex-
tend to ordinary commercial contractual relationships such as the sup-
230. Id. at 760.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 761-762.
233. Southwest Materials Handling v. Nissan Motor Co., No. 3:98-CV-2367-X, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16275 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Southwest Materials].
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plier-distributor relationship" (internal citations omitted). 234 Rather,
absent a special relationship Texas courts defaulted to the general con-
tractual duty of good faith and fair dealing set forth in the UCC to be
used as a guide in interpreting the contract.2 35
VI. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES -
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In Patel v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc.,236 the court held that
plaintiffs failed to plead they provided defendants with the required 60-
day notice under the DTPA, nor had plaintiffs pled that either of the
exceptions to the notice requirement were applicable. As a result, the
court held that defendants were entitled to have the case held in abey-
ance until plaintiffs complied with the DTPA's notice requirements. 237
B. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
In Amerispec, Inc. v. Metro Inspection Services, Inc.,238 the court found
a sufficient basis to enforce, in part, a post-termination covenant not to
compete in the context of a preliminary injunction. Amerispec is a
franchisor which provides real estate inspection services. It argued that a
former franchisee should be enjoined from competing within the
franchise agreement's designated area, within a radius of 10 miles from its
designated territory, and within 10 miles of any Amerispec location.2 39
The court held that the first two were geographically reasonable, but
modified the third portion of the covenant, as the court held there was no
evidence that competitors operating in this "vast" market would ad-
versely affect the goodwill of Amerispec.2 40 Thus, while the courts remain
willing to protect the legitimate interests of franchisors and their systems,
the extent of the restraint must be reasonable. On a separate note, the
court did not require the franchisor to post a bond or other security for
the preliminary injunction due to specific terms of the franchise
agreement. 241
234. Id. at *3.
235. Id.
236. Patel v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 821 (N.D. Tex.
2001).
237. Id. at 826.
238. Amerispec, Inc. v. Metro Inspection Servs, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0946-D, 2001 WL
770999, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2001).
239. Id. at *6.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *7.
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VII. REMEDIES: DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
The Lanham Act affords protection to the holder or registrant of a
registered mark from infringement by unauthorized users and protects
purchasers from being misled as to the identity of the business from
which the goods and services are obtained. The enforcement powers of
the Lanham Act include both monetary damages and injunctive relief.242
With regard to compensatory damages, the Lanham Act gives the trial
court broad discretion in determining the appropriate amount of dam-
ages.243 The court is limited only by principles of equity, however, the
court is restricted from making any award that is punitive in nature rather
than simply compensatory. 244
In Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications,
Inc.,245 in addition to addressing the trademark infringement issue dis-
cussed supra, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the damage
award was premised on penalizing the defendants rather than compensat-
ing the plaintiffs. 246 Dial One, as franchisor, and two of its franchisees,
brought an infringement suit against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,
among others, for listing a terminated franchisee in both the Yellow and
White pages despite the fact that BellSouth had received notice of the
termination.247 BellSouth contended that it was an "innocent infringer"
under Section 1114(2) of the Lanham Act, which limits the persons bring-
ing actions under Sections 1114(1) and 1125(a) to injunctive relief if the
defendant is an "innocent infringer. '248 The trial court held that Bell-
South was not an innocent infringer and awarded damages to plaintiffs in
the form of lost profits, but did not include any damages for loss of good-
will.249 BellSouth and the other defendants challenged the standard used
by the district court in applying the innocent infringer defense and the
award of damages. Dial One cross-appealed the trial court's refusal to
consider evidence of loss of goodwill to the Dial One mark.250
At the outset, the court noted that the issue of the proper standard to
be used in applying the innocent infringer defense was one of first im-
pression in the Fifth Circuit.251 BellSouth argued that legislative history
of the statute required the court to read "innocent" to mean "without
242. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1994 & Supp. 2001); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v.
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 75-76 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
standard of review for sufficiency of evidence supporting award of damages is clear error).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
245. Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecom., Inc, 269 F. 3d 523, 527 (5th
Cir. 2001).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 525.
248. Id. at 525-26; see 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(A) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2001).
249. Dial One of the Mid-South Inc., 269 F.3d at 525.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 526.
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constitutional actual malice. '252 After applying statutory interpretation
principles, the court concluded that it could not rely on the very limited
legislative history and, thus, the proper standard for evaluating whether
an infringer is innocent is "objective reasonableness. ' 253 The court found
that there was no constitutional mandate to protect this type of speech
under the heightened actual malice standard 254 and that the actual malice
standard was inappropriate in this context.255 Because BellSouth and the
other defendants received notice of the termination of the franchise rela-
tionship, but failed to remove the terminated franchisee from the phone
book listing, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's holding that the
defendants were not innocent infringers. 256
Next, the court addressed defendants' challenge to the awarded dam-
ages, which were premised on a calculation of lost profits. The Fifth Cir-
cuit upheld the damage award finding no indication of an award premised
on penalizing the defendants rather than compensating plaintiffs.257
While the Fifth Circuit was not overly impressed with the evidence put
forth on plaintiffs' damages, the court found that the district court
weighed several factors, including: "possible uncertainty in the estimates
of future profits, whether evidence was corroborated, whether the harm
from the infringing listing would continue beyond the actual period of
infringement, and possible variability of profit margins. '258
Lastly, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's decision on a mo-
tion in limine to exclude any evidence of damage to Dial One's goodwill.
The Fifth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's find-
ing that the goodwill of the Dial One mark did not suffer when a non-
franchisee was erroneously listed in the phone book.259 It should be
noted however, that counsel for Dial One did not make an offer of proof
as to what evidence it would have put on in order to show the loss of
goodwill either after the motion in limine was granted or at the time of
trial.260 Without any evidence of loss of goodwill, it was not an abuse of
discretion on the part of the district court to find that the improper listing
252. Id. BellSouth relied upon a statement by a co-sponsor of a 1988 amendment to the
Lanham Act expressing a desire for "innocent" to incorporate the "actual malice" standard
in N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
253. Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc., 269 F.3d at 526.
254. In addressing issues of commercial speech, the Supreme Court has held that when
matters are not of public concern, they are not judged by the actual malice standard. Dial
One of the Mid-South, Inc., 269 F.3d at 526 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985)). In the present case, the improper listing of a
service repair business is not a matter of public concern. The Fifth Circuit concluded that
"the interest of the public is probably best protected by allowing the suit to proceed with-
out an actual malice defense, so as to promote accuracy in this type of speech." Id. at 527.
255. Id. at 526.
256. Id. at 527.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc., 269 F.3d at 527-28.
260. Id. at 528. Due to the limited record, the Fifth Circuit offered no opinion on "the
ownership of the mark or the feasibility of recovering goodwill damages where the plaintiff
is the only licensee of the mark." Id.
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of a terminated franchisee had little or no effect on the goodwill of the
Dial One mark.261
B. CIVIL PENALTIES
In addition to compensatory damages, defendants may also be assessed
civil penalties under the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code (the
Code).262 The applicability of these civil penalties is dependent upon the
authority of the Texas Motor Vehicle Board (the Board)263 and does not
include an award of damages by the Board.264 Two Texas Court of Ap-
peals cases addressed the issue of the applicability and scope of civil pen-
alties. First, in Sportscoach Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Eastex Camper Sales,
Inc.,265 the Code did not grant the Board authority to order a damage
payment to the terminated franchisee dealer.2 66 The court found that
Sportscoach, the recreational vehicle manufacturer, violated the Code by
failing to repurchase some recreational vehicles from its franchisee after
termination. The Board had no statutory power to assess damages or
order payment of damages to a private party, but did have power to as-
sess civil penalties, issue cease and desist orders, and issue injunctions. 267
Thus, the order for payment of damages based upon a finding of a viola-
tion by the Board was reversed and remanded to district court.268
Second, in American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Texas Department of
Transportation-Motor Vehicle Division,269 the Board contended that its
enforcement powers allowed it to impose civil penalties against the
franchisor, Honda, regardless of whether the franchisee's complaint was
viable under the act.270 The Austin Court of Appeals held that the Board
lacked jurisdiction to impose civil penalties;271 the franchisee's complaint
was not viable due to a statutory revision, and the Board invoked jurisdic-
tion based solely on the franchisee's complaint. The Board's authority to
assess civil penalties is limited to proceedings "conducted in accordance
with the Act," which necessarily contemplates a proper invocation of ju-
risdiction.272 Thus, where the complaint is invalid, the Board has no juris-
diction and cannot act nor impose civil penalties. It should be noted that
261. Id.
262. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) § 1.02 (West Supp. 2001).
263. Id. § 2.01.
264. Sportscoach Corp. v. Eastex Camper Sales, 31 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. App.-Austin
2001, no pet.); see Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 855
S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ) (stating that agency may exercise only
specific powers conferred by legislature under express language of statute).
265. 31 S.W.3d at 730.
266. Id. at 735-36.
267. Id. at 734-35.
268. Id. at 736.
269. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Texas Dep't Transp., 47 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2001, pet. denied).
270. Id. at 620.
271. Id. at 624-25.




the court abstained from addressing the issue of whether the Board pos-
sesses the authority to institute proceedings independent of the fran-
chisee's complaint, because those facts were not before the court.273
C. LOST PROFIT DAMAGES
In the past year the Texas Court of Appeals in Texarkana addressed
the recoverability of actual damages and lost profits for tortious interfer-
ence with an asset purchase agreement. In Fun Motors of Longview v.
Gratty, Inc. ,274 Gratty brought suit against Fun Motors of Longview, and
its principle, for breach of an asset purchase agreement and against the
principle of Fun Motors, Louis Randall Latch, for tortious interference
with the asset purchase agreement.275 According to Gratty, he and Fun
Motors entered into an asset purchase agreement whereby by Gratty
would purchase Fun Motors in order to sell Kawasaki all terrain vehicles
"ATV's." As a condition precedent, the asset purchase agreement was
subject to Kawasaki's approval of Gratty as a franchisee. According to
the evidence put forth, not only did Latch delay Gratty's franchise appli-
cation, but after submitting Gratty's application to Kawasaki, Latch en-
tered into another asset purchase agreement with Scott Zhone and
submitted Zhone's franchise application to Kawasaki.276 When Kawasaki
asked Latch which of the two applications it should consider, Latch did
not respond. Thereafter, Kawasaki terminated its franchise agreement
with Fun Motors. 277 The trial court found that Latch's conduct prevented
Gratty from obtaining Kawasaki's approval and, thus, resulted in tortious
interference with a contract. Gratty was awarded compensatory damages
in the amount of $42,901.87 and $133,000.00 in lost profits.278
Both the liability and damage findings were appealed. After affirming
liability, the court of appeals reviewed the damage finding de novo. Pur-
suant to the de novo standard, the damage finding must be upheld if it
can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. 279 The
court of appeals found that compensatory damages in the form of: legal
fees to prepare the necessary agreements; legal fees to organize the busi-
ness and building; and business expenses for the proposed location of the
new franchise, were foreseeable and therefore recoverable. 280 Such ex-
penses were foreseeable because they were incurred in order to obtain
Kawasaki's approval which was required as a condition precedent to the
sale of the franchise. 281 Moreover, the cause in fact element was met as
Gratty testified that he would not have incurred such expenses were it
273. Id. at 625-26.
274. Fun Motors of Longview v. Gratty, Inc., 51 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2001, pet. filed).
275. Id. at 760.
276. Id. at 759.
277. Id. at 759-60.
278. Fun Motors, 51 S.W.3d at 763.
279. Id.




not for his agreement to purchase Fun Motor's Kawasaki franchise which
was subsequently frustrated by Latch. 282
Next, Latch contested the award of lost profits contending that the fu-
ture profits were too speculative as they arose from a "new" enter-
prise.28 3 As in the case of many breaches or interference claims with an
asset purchase agreement, the individual or company to operate the
franchise is new, but the operation of a franchise in and of itself is not a
new enterprise. Thus, it is important to remember that in determining
lost profits of a particular enterprise, the "enterprise" referred to is not
the potential new franchisee's business, but rather the activity that is al-
leged to have been damaged.28 4
The Texas Supreme Court held "the fact that an enterprise is new will
not automatically preclude recovery for future lost profits, but rather is
one factor in the 'reasonable certainty' test. '285 The reasonable certainty
test focuses on three elements: (1) the experience of the person involved
in the enterprise, (2) the nature of the business activity; and (3) the rele-
vant market.2 86 Therefore, even though an individual is a new franchisee,
lost profits may still be recoverable if: the person involved has an estab-
lished record in the business; the activity was for the sale of an estab-
lished product; and the requesting party can demonstrate to a reasonable
certainty the volume of sales in the relevant market.2 87
In Fun Motors, the evidence showed that Gratty had a successful busi-
ness selling ATV's for the previous nine to ten years and, thus, Gratty
had experience and knowledge to succeed in the business activity.288
Moreover, the sale of Kawasaki motorcycles was considered the sale of
an established product. In order to attack the lost profits calculation,
Latch contended that Gratty's probable volume in the relevant market
was not sufficiently certain due to the lack of evidence of a suitable com-
parison model.289
282. Id. at 764.
283. Id. (citing Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097 (Tex. 1938)).
284. Id. at 764. In Fun Motors, the enterprise was not Gratty, Inc. formed by Gratty in
anticipation of purchasing the Kawasaki franchise, but was the sale of Kawasaki
motorcycles in the relevant market.
285. Id. at 764 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Teltron Energy Mgmt., Inc. 877 S.W.2d
276, 279-280 (Tex. 1994) (providing a more recent explanation and interpretation of the
Texas Supreme Court case of Southwest Battery Corp. v. Owen, 115 S.W.2d 1097 (Tex.
1938)).
286. Fun Motors, 51 S.W.3d at 764.
287. Id.; see Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 348-349 (Tex. 1955) (upholding lost
profit damages where the established product was cigarettes); Southwest Battery Corp. v.
Owen, 115 S.W.2d at 1097 (Tex. 1938) (involving an established product such as car
batteries).
288. Fun Motors of Longview, 51 S.W.3d at 765.
289. Id. According to Latch, there were comparison models available but they were
not offered into evidence by Gratty, including Gratty's own past performance as dealer,
Fun Motor's past performance in Longview and the present Longview Kawasaki dealers'
performance. However, the court determined that the performance figures would not pro-
vide a good comparison base because: Gratty's prior market was much smaller; Fun Mo-
tors emphasized the sale of Honda over Kawasaki; and the current Longview dealership
did not operate under the same business plan as proposed by Gratty. Id.
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To prove his lost profit damages, Gratty introduced testimony of a pro-
fessor of accounting.2 90 Gratty's expert based his lost profit calculations
upon information relating to Gratty's prior business, various markets and
market share data for ATV's, market sales forecasts by Kawasaki's re-
gional sales director, and demographics of the Longview area (relevant
market area), as well as other financial and economic data models.2 91
Latch did not present an alternative damage model, but rather attempted
to poke holes in Gratty's damage model. Latch showed that Gratty's pro-
jected gross sales for 1999 overshot the actual 1999 gross sales of the cur-
rent Kawasaki dealership.2 92 Such evidence was most likely taken into
consideration by the jury as Gratty's expert testified that Gratty suffered
past lost profits in a range of $133,333.00 to $158,333.00, and future lost
profits of $363,802.00 to $432,014.00, yet the trial court limited damages
for lost profits to only $133,000.00. Based upon the record on appeal, the
court of appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a
finding of lost profit damages and that such damages had been proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty. 293
D. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The intellectual property of a franchise including its trademark, trade
name, proprietary system of operation, and trade dress, are all valuable
and unique assets which many times can only be protected by seeking
injunctive relief. A franchisor may seek both a temporary and permanent
injunction in order to prevent an individual from infringing on its intellec-
tual property and to prevent an unauthorized user from tarnishing the
franchisor's reputation, trade and goodwill among its customers. 2 94
Under federal common law, in order to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion, the party seeking such relief must establish each of the following
four requirements: (1) a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the
merits; (2) a substantial threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the
injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to it outweighs
the threatened harm the injunction may do to the enjoined party; and (4)
granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.2 95
290. The qualifications of Gratty's expert, Dr. Sammie P. Smith, were not challenged.
Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 765-66.
293. Id. at 766. In addition to the market share challenged, Latch questioned whether
Gratty's calculation of lost profits took into consideration the $90,000.00 purchase price of
the franchise. While Gratty's expert did not set out his lost profit calculation in detail, the
court of appeals concluded that because the expert used terminology distinguishing gross
sales from profit, it would be presumed that he accounted for the cost of various assets in
calculating profit. Id.
294. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
295. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv. Inc., 807 F.2d 1256,
1259 (5th Cir. 1987); Enter. Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762
F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1985). As set forth in footnote (75) above, Texas state common law
provides for three specific elements for a temporary injunction.
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In Ramada Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc.,296 the Northern
District of Texas applied this four-part preliminary injunction standard to
determine whether Ramada was entitled to a preliminary injunction to
prevent former franchisees from marketing, promoting, or renting their
guest lodging facility in such a manner that the hotel was falsely desig-
nated as a Ramada.297 Ramada licenses its franchisees to operate hotels
and motels under the Ramada trademark and provides its franchisees ac-
cess to a centralized reservation system, advertising, and the right to use
the Ramada name and logo. In the Jacobcart matter, the franchisees
failed to make the contractually required improvements to their facilities
and pay the periodic fees required by the franchise agreement. Ramada
brought suit to enjoin the terminated franchisees from using the Ramada
marks and to require the terminated franchisees to "completely deiden-
tify the unit from its appearance as a Ramada guest lodging facility. '298
The court issued the preliminary injunction finding that Ramada easily
established the four-part preliminary injunction standard.
First, Ramada showed a likelihood of success on its Lanham Act claim,
as the court found Ramada's trademark was clearly protected as a distinc-
tive and arbitrary mark and the terminated franchisees' actions consti-
tuted trademark infringement. 299 The court in fact, found that the
Ramada name was entitled to the highest degree of protection.300
Ramada established the second element, because the injunction was
granted "in a trademark infringement case and thus, 'a substantial likeli-
hood of confusion constitutes irreparable injury." 301 The court found
that the necessity of preventing confusion is particularly pressing in the
context of a motel chain as a bad experience may cause a guest to stay at
a particular franchise only once. Ramada would suffer irreparable injury
due to customer confusion created by a substandard non-Ramada fran-
chisee.302 Next, the court found that as a whole, the threatened injury to
Ramada outweighed the threatened harm to the terminated franchis-
ees.3 3 Finally, the court found that because Ramada would suffer sub-
stantial harm if it could not control its own reputation and goodwill,
296. Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. 3:01 CV-0306-D, 2001 WL
540213, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
297. Id. at *1.
298. Id.
299. Id. at *2.
300. Id. "Fanciful and arbitrary marks are the strongest types of marks." Id. (quoting
Lawfinders Assoc. Inv. v. Legal Research Ctr., 65 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1998)).
"Arbitrary and fanciful terms or phrases are those which are either coined words or words
which are not suggestive of the product or the service." Id. "A fanciful mark is a combina-
tion of letters or other symbols signifying nothing other than the product or service to
which the mark has been assigned." Id.
301. Id. at *3 (citing KFC Corp. v. Goldey, 714 F. Supp. 264, 267 (W.D. Ky. 1989)); see
Joy Mfg. Co. v. CGN Valve & Gauge Co., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (S.D. Tex. 1989)
(stating that the basic test for trademark infringement is "likelihood of confusion," actual
confusion is not necessary).
302. Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc., No. 3:01 CV-0306-D, 2001 WL
540213, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
303. Id. at *3.
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granting the preliminary injunction would not disserve the public
interest.304
In addition to protecting a franchisor's intellectual property, a
franchisor may seek a temporary injunction to enforce a non-competition
agreement. In AmeriSpec, Inc. v. Metro Inspection Services, Inc.,305 the
franchisor did both. As previously noted, AmeriSpec, Inc., is a franchisor
of a business which provides real estate inspection services. After operat-
ing an AmeriSpec franchise for ten years, Wayne and Debra Holt decided
not to renew the franchise agreement and formed Metro Inspection Ser-
vices. 30 6 First, AmeriSpec sought to enjoin the Holts and Metro from
using the AmeriSpec trademark or trade name in telephone listings.30 7
AmeriSpec specifically complained about the continued listing of the
AmeriSpec name in the yellow and white pages of the telephone directo-
ries. The Holts, however, produced evidence that they notified the tele-
phone company that: (1) Metro was not authorized to use the former
AmeriSpec numbers; (2) requested new telephone numbers and fax lines;
and (3) that the delay in canceling the AmeriSpec phone numbers was
due solely to the telephone company. 308 Thus, there was no basis to en-
join Metro from using its new unrelated telephone numbers.30 9
Second, AmeriSpec sought to enjoin the Holts and Metro from provid-
ing real estate inspection services that violated the franchise agreement's
covenant not to compete.310 Specifically, AmeriSpec sought to enforce a
post-termination covenant which required that for a period of one year,
the franchise could not directly or indirectly operate, own, be employed
by, or consult with any business that conducts residential building inspec-
tions or provide business inspection services, other than the one operated
under a valid AmeriSpec franchise, within the franchise agreement's des-
304. Id. It should be noted that the Jacobcart case has recently been subsequently cited
by Judge Fitzwater with approval in support of a preliminary injunction issued on a trade
dress violation claim. See Urgent Gear, Inc. v. Savoia, No. 3:01-CV-2190-D, 2001 WL
1577395 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2001). In Urgent Gear, Inc. v. Savoia, the court found that
Savoia was infringing on Urgent Gear's protected trade dress by marketing knock-off
clothing products containing certain inherently distinctive features of the Urgent Gear
trade dress. Id. at *5.
305. Amerispec, Inc. v. Metro Inspection Serv., Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0946-D, 2001 WL
770999, at *1 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
306. Id. at *2.
307. Id.
308. Id. at *3.
309. Id.
310. Id. at *4. A covenant not to compete is enforceable under Texas law "to the extent
that it contains limitations as to time, geographic area, and scope of activity to be re-
strained that are reasonable and do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to
protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 15.50(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001). In the present case, no challenge was made as to the
period of time. The Holts and Metro limited their challenge the activity restrained and the
geographical scope. AmeriSpec contended that if the covenant not to compete was found
to be unreasonable, it must be reformed under both Section 15.51(c) of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code and the terms of the franchise agreement itself. The court summarily
dismissed the Holts and Metro's challenge as to the scope of activity and analyzed and
reformed the geographic scope.
1108 [Vol. 55
FRANCHISE LAW
ignated territory or within a radius of ten miles from the location of any
other AmeriSpec office in existence at the time of expiration or termina-
tion of the franchise agreement. 31' The court reformed the covenant not
to compete and held that AmeriSpec was entitled to a preliminary injunc-
tion preventing the Holts and Metro from competing at least within a ten
mile radius from its designated territory under the terminated franchise
agreement. The court further held it unreasonable to extend the pro-
tected territory to include areas surrounding other AmeriSpec offices, be-
cause it would impose a greater restraint on trade than necessary to
protect the goodwill and business interest of AmeriSpec. In reaching this
decision, the court found that the AmeriSpec trademark had developed
goodwill and that AmeriSpec was "entitled to protect that goodwill by
preventing a former franchisee who operated under its trademark for ten
years from competing against it.' ' 312 The court further found that the
portion of the covenant not to compete which prohibited the Holts and
Metro from operating in a vast market beyond their former designated
franchise territory was geographically unreasonable as there was no evi-
dence that such competition would be based upon use of the goodwill of
the franchise. 313 Thus, the covenant not to compete was reformed by the
court and enforced in the more limited geographical area.
One of the cases cited in the 2001 Franchise Law Update has since
been reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court. Ford Motor Co. v.
Butnaru314 involved a suit by potential buyers of a Ford dealership
against the dealership and its shareholders and another buyer for breach
of a purchase and sale agreement, and the manufacturer, Ford, for tor-
tious interference. 315 The trial court granted a temporary injunction 316
preventing Ford from exercising its right of first refusal to buy the dealer-
ship at issue. The San Antonio Court of Appeals dissolved the temporary
injunction concluding that the temporary injunction by the trial court
constitutes nothing more than an attempt to enforce a contract by injunc-
tion, which is improper because a suit for damages is deemed an adequate
remedy. 317 Plaintiffs sought review by the Texas Supreme Court con-
tending that: (1) they were not required to show the lack of an adequate
legal remedy because the injunction was based upon an alleged statutory
311. AmeriSpec, Inc., 2001 WL 770999, at *5.
312. Id. at *4.
313. Id. at *6.
314. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 808 (Tex. June 7, 2001).
315. Id. at 808-09.
316. "Under Texas state common law, to obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant
must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant;
(2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent and irreparable
injury in the interim." Id. at 813 (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993);
Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. 1968); Fasken v. Darby, 901 S.W.2d
591, 592 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ); Henderson v. KRTS, Inc., 822 S.W.2d 769, 773
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). Further, an injury cannot be irreparable if
the injured party can be adequately compensated by damages which can be measured by a
certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 813.
317. Id. at 809.
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violation; 318 and alternatively (2) they lacked an adequate remedy be-
cause Ford's exercise of its right of first refusal, would deprive plaintiffs
of an opportunity to purchase unique assets-real property and the deal-
ership located on the real property.319
In addressing the first issue, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
Butnarus were not relieved from their burden of establishing an inade-
quate legal remedy. The Texas Supreme Court distinguished the case re-
lied upon by Butnarus finding that there was no general rule that an
alleged statutory violation relieves the party seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion from proving the lack of an adequate legal remedy. The court, in
dicta, recognized that some specific statutes granted a party the right to
an injunction and a party relying on such a statutory right need not prove
the lack of a legal remedy.
Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's grant-
ing of an injunction prohibiting Ford from exercising its right of first re-
fusal. The court found that the Butnarus met their burden on the three
temporary injunction elements by showing: (1) the Butnarus had a direct
cause of action against Ford for tortious interference with the asset
purchase agreement; (2) Ford's exercising of its right of first refusal would
amount to tortious interference with the Butnarus' contract to purchase
real property and the dealership; and (3) the Butnarus would suffer immi-
nent and irreparable injury if Ford was allowed to exercise its right of first
refusal because Butnarus would lose the opportunity to purchase two
unique assets, the real property and the dealership. 320
Finally, in an interesting case out of the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania, a permanent injunction was issued which included an injunction
of the terminated franchisee's use of the phone numbers used during the
course of the franchise relationship and the transfer of such phone num-
bers from the terminated franchisee to the franchisor. 321 This case in-
volved a real estate franchise wherein the Skillmans entered into a
franchise agreement authorizing them to open and operate a "Realty Ex-
ecutives" franchise in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. 322 After operating
the Realty Executives office for over five years, the franchise agreement
was subsequently terminated, and the Skillmans established a new real
estate business under the name "Realty Excel." The Skillmans trans-
ferred the telephone numbers used while operating as Realty Executives
to the new Realty Excel. RESPA, the franchisor of Realty Executives,
sought and obtained a temporary injunction. Thereafter, a permanent in-
318. Id. at 813 (relying upon Furr v. Hall, 553 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
319. Id. at 813 (arguing that lack of an opportunity to purchase real property and the
dealership could not be remedied by money damages).
320. Id. at 815 (recognizing a trial court may grant equitable relief when a dispute in-
volves real property).
321. RESPA of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Skillman, 768 A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
322. Id. at 337.
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junction hearing was held.323 In response to RESPA's demand for a per-
manent injunction, the Skillmans argued that the franchise agreement did
not contain a requirement that the franchisee transfer phone numbers to
the franchisor upon termination; and alternatively that the proper rem-
edy was not an injunction, but rather to transfer the telephone numbers
to a "split-interrupt" service which would allow callers to choose whether
they wanted to contact Realty Executives or Realty Excel.324 The court
entered the permanent injunction based upon the strong possibility of
public confusion.325 The court found that the use of the name Realty
Excel was so closely related to Realty Executives that it would likely lead
to public confusion. 326 Moreover, the Skillmans failed to distinguish
themselves from the former Realty Executives through an aggressive ad-
vertising campaign or otherwise. It was clear that the Skillmans hoped to
capitalize on the goodwill of the former franchisor and, thus, they were
enjoined from doing so.327
323. Id. at 338.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 342.
326. RESPA, 768 A.2d at 341-42.
327. Id. at 342.
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